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LABOR SUPPLY FLEXIBILITY AND PORTFOLIO CHOICE
ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model showing that people who have
flexibility in choosing how much to work will prefer to invest
substantially more of their money in risky assets than if they
had no such flexibility. Viewed in this way, labor supply
flexibilty offers insurance against adverse investment outcomes.
The model provides support for the conventional wisdom that the
young can tolerate more risk in theirinvestment portfolios than
the old.
The model has other implications for the study of household
financial behavior over the life cycle. It implies that
households will take account of the value of labor supply
flexibility in deciding how much to invest in their own human
capital and when to retire. At the macro level it impliesthat
people will have a labor supply response to shocksin the
financial markets.
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Boston University Boston University
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(617)353-4160 (617)353-3631i. Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that fluctuations in investment
income influence the amount an individual may choose to work. We
have all heard stories about the successful investor who retires
at age 40 after having made a "killing" in the stock market. On
the other hand, a hapless investor may be forced to delay
retirement or take an extra job because an investment turned
sour.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the interaction
between labor supply and portfolio decisions --asubject which
has received little attention in the economics and finance
literature. Finance theorists have studied the effect of human
capital on portfolio choice but have taken the quantity of labor
as given rather than as a choice variable.' Labor economists, on
the other hand, have either treated the portfolio mix as given or
ignored it altogether in their models of labor marketbehavior.'
While for many purposes it makes sense to compartmentalize
these decisions, the interactions btween them can be
significant. Our analysis shows that an individual who has
'See Mayers (1972) and Williams (1978].
'See Killingsworth (1983] for an extensive survey of life
cycle labor supply models.
1flexibility in choosing how much or how long to work later in
life will prefer to invest substantially more of his money in
risky assets than if he had no such flexibility. Viewed in this
way, labor supply flexibilty is a kind of insurance against
adverse investment outcomes.
An important corollary to this finding is that the
interaction between investment and labor decisions depends
strongly on the individual's stage in the life cycle. According
to practitioners' conventional wisdom, the young can tolerate
more risk in their investment portfolios than the old. Indeed,
guides to personal investing usually advise that as one
approaches retirement, investments should shift from riskier
assets like common stocks to more conservative fixed-income
securities. This conventional wisdom is well accepted but often
for the wrong reasons.3
This contention finds support in our analysis. The young
have a greater opportunity to insure against adverse portfolio
outcomes through their future work effort. The main asset of
young workers is their future earning power. For most young
people, huaan capital is many times as great as non—human wealth
held in the form of bank accounts, real estate, and securities.
Flexibility in labor supply, therefore, plays a much greater role
in the portfolio decisions of the young than of the old.
3See Samue]son [1989).
2The interaction of labor supply and portfolio choice has
potentially important macroeconomic implications. With highly
flexible labor supply, we would expect to observe stabilizing
labor market responses to price shocks in securities markets.
For example, we would expect to see an increase in labor supply
in the aftermath of the October 1987 stock market crash.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
present a simple two—period model of individual labor supply and
asset allocation. The model confirms that the ability to adjust
labor supply after investment outcomes are known increases the
amount a rational consumer/investor invests in risky assets. In
the next section, we extend the model to a multiperiod setting to
explore labor supply and portfolio choice over the life cycle. A
concluding section considers the empirical implications of our
model and discusses possible directions for future research.
2. A Two-Period Model.
Our purpose is to construct and analyze the simplest model
that can capture the effect of cx postlabor/leisurechoice on
investment decisions. Accordingly, the timing of the model
involves only two stages.
In the first stage, th. individual determines his current
investment decision.4 In the second stage, the rate of return on
4He presumably is also working, but the model abstracts from
any labor decisions at this point. That is, we presume that he
has already made his optimal labor decision for this time period.
3his investment is realized. Given his resulting wealth, he may
then adjust his labor supply choice, increasing his labor
earnings at the sacrifice of leisure or vice—versa.
For the moment, we abstract from additional time periods and
from consumption and savings decisions. Thus, the individual's
sole objective is to maximize his final period utility, which
depends on his realized wealth and leisure.
The precise formulation of the individual's problem is as
follows. In the first period, a risk—averse individual invests
his wealth in two assets: a risk-free asset and a risky asset.
Let r and z denote the realized returns of the respective assets,
W0 denote his initial wealth, and x the fraction of his wealth
invested in the risky asset.
In addition to his investment income, the individual
receives labor income from working in the second period. He
allocates his time between work hours H and leisure hours L,
subject to the (normalized) constraint, L +H1. Thus, his
labor earnings are WHH —W1(l—L),where W11 denotes the maximum
wage income that the individual could earn if he consumed no
leisure (L0). It is useful to think of W! as the value of the
individual's human capital, (all or some of which he may choose
to take as leisure). This human capital is denominated in terms
of the single consumption good and therefore embodies an
assumption about the relative price of leisure.
Since, by assumption, there are no bequests, the individual
spends all his accumulated wealth in the second (and final)
4period. He spends part of it on the single consumption good, C,





The last line treats the consumption/leisure choice in the
standard way: the individual allocates his total wealth,
W(z) =[1+r+x(z—r))W0+W,between leisure ("purchased" at
price W) and consumption (the numeraire good).
The individual's objective is to maximize the expected value
of his cardinal utility function, the arguments of which are
consumption and leisure. That is, he maximizes E[U(C,L)]
subject to the budget constraint (1). Here, U is a concave
function with second partial derivatives satisfying U <0and
ULL<O•
Two versions of the probl.a are of particular interest. In
the ex ante version, the individual chooses x and L at the
outset. Whatever the actual performanc. of his investment, the
individual is committed to the fixed employment decision he
entered into initially. In the cx post version, the individual
chooses L after he observes the realized return z and, of course,
his investment wealth.
These two versions are represented as follows:
5Max E(U(C(Z),L))) it. (1) (Vi)
x, L
Max E(U(C(z),L(Z)] s.t. (1)
x L(z) argmax U(C,L) (V2)
The notation, C(z), makes explicit the dependence of
consumption on the realized investment return z. Note that in
version two, the optimal consumption/leisure choice takes place
under certainty —-thatis, after the investment uncertainty has
been resolved.
The paper's main hypothesis is:
Hi: The individual's investment in the risky asset will be
greater in V2 than in Vi.
Roughly speaking, the individual invests more in the risky asset
in V2 because his ability to earn discretionary labor income
serves as a kind of insurance against bad investment outcomes.
Our task is to examine the circumstances under which the stated
result holds.
To investigate this hypothesis, we start with the simplest
possible setting, described by the following assumption.
Al. The risky asset has only two possible return realizations, z1
and z2, occuring with probabilities p1 and PZ, where P1 +P2=
Remark.For the investment problem to be non—trivial, the
returns of the risky asset must n.ithsr dominate nor be dominated
by the return of the risk—free asset. Thus, we assume:
r2—z2—r>Oandr1—z1—r<O.
In addition, to be attractive to the risk averse investor, the
expected return of the risky asset must exceed the risk-free
6return: p1r1 +p2r2>0.
Equations 1and2 list the first-order conditions for
version1, while equations 3 and 4 list the first-order
conditions for version 2.
VL =pl[_WHUC(Cl,L*)+UL(Cl,L*)]+pz(_WIIUC(Cz,L*)+UL(Cz,L*)]=0 (1)
x*such that: V =p1r1Uc(C1,L*)+ p2r2TJc(C2,L*) =0 (2)
VL1 =WHUC(Cl,Ll)+UL(Cl,Lj)=0;
VL2 =—WHUC(Cz,Lz)+UL(Cz,Lz)=0 (3)
x' such that: V =p1r1U(C1,L1)+p2r2U(C2,L2)=0. (4)
In the equations above, V denotes the individual's expected
utility, subscripts x, C, and L denote partial derivatives, and
C and L1 denote consumption and leisure when the return is z.
The first-order condition in (2) implies the well-known
result that a risk-averse individual always makes a positive
(perhaps very small) investment in the risky asset provided the
expected excess return is positive. (Note that C1 =C2at x =0.
Since p1r1 +p2r2>0,it follows that V >0at x =0.Restoring
the first-order condition requires raising x* above zero.)
By carefully examining the first-order conditions, we can
demonstrate the general result that labor flexibility induces the
individual to invest more in the risky asset: x' >x.The proof
is in the appendix.
Proposition One. Given Al, the individual's investment in the
risky asset is strictly greater when labor supply is flexible
(and labor is actually varied ex post) than when it is fixed.
7Remark. A useful way to highlight the intuition behind this
result is to appeal to the well-known case of additive separable
utility. Suppose utility is of the form: U =g(c)+h(L),where
g and h are concave in their respective arguments. Since the
cross partial U is zero, it follows that leisure is a normal
good. Thus, the individual increases his consumption of leisure
(reduces his working hours) upon a favorable wealth realization
from his investment. The opposite outcome occurs for an
unfavorable realization. To put this another way, the individual
treats his discretionary labor income as a partial substitute for
his investment income. Consequently, the individual invests a
greater amount in the risky asset under flexible labor supply
than under fixed supply (that is, Proposition One holds).
Four examples illustrate the implications of Proposition
One.
Example 1. U(C,L) =V[g(C)+rL],where V and g are concave
functions. Assuming an interior optimum, the individual adjusts
his leisure to exactly offset fluctuations in consumption that
might result from fluctuations in investment income. That is,
C(z)C*, for all z. The investor in effect enjoys perfect
insurance. He adjusts L according to L(W(z) —C*)/Wa.As a
result of Proposition One, it follows that x' >x.
If the function V is linear (so that the individual is risk
neutral with respect to fluctuations in leisure), the investor
will place the maximum amount in th. risky asset. By contrast,
under fixed labor supply, he will limit investment in the risky
8asset due to risk aversion (since g is concave).
Example 2. U(C,L)V(C + h(L)), where V and h are increasing
and concave functions. This is the converse case to Example 1.
It follows that L(z)L* for all z. That is, the individual's
optimal choice of leisure is invariant to the investment outcome.
Consequently, labor flexibility serves no insurance function and
provides no advantage. The solutions to Vi and V2 are identical
in all respects and so x* =x'.Thus, this case offers an
obvious counterexample to Proposition One. That is, the
individual must actually exercise labor supply flexibility ex
post in order for x' to exceed x*.
Example 3. U(C,L) =log(C)+ rlog(L).
In the version 1 solution, labor supply is fixed at L*.
From the first—order condition in (2), one finds:
x*W0 —((p1r1+ p2r2)/(—r1r2))((W0(i+r) + WH(l_L*)],(5)
or more compactly:x*W0 —•WT,where
•— ((p1r1+ p2r2)/(-rr2)] and W —W0(1+r)+ W,(l-L*).
The result in (5) has an appealing interpretation. The
dollar investment in the risky asset is proportional to WT, the
future value of the individualts total wealth (current wealth
invested at the risk—free rate plus future labor earnings). The
proportionality factor •isa function of the expected excess
return on the risky asset (the numerator) and a measure of
variance (the denominator).
9As one would expect, a higher mean or lower variance
increases the investment in the risky asset. If one rewrites (5)
as x* =[l+ r + WH(l -L*)/W0],one sees that the proportion of
current wealth invested in the risky asset increases with the
level of human capital.
For logarithmic utility and flexible labor supply, one finds
that:
L(z) =tF/(l+F)]W(7)/Wg (6)
that is, leisure consumed is just proportional to realized total
wealth,W(z), and inversely proportional to Wil (the price of
leisure). In turn, the indirect utility function takes the form
kLog(W(z)),where k is a constant that depends on I' and WH.
Since the indirect utility functions for Vi and V2 have the
same form, so too do the solutions for x. The explicit solution
for x' is:
x'W0 =((p1r1+ p2r2)/(—r1r2)][W0(l+r) + Wli) (5')
Though similar in form, equations (5) and (5') differ in a
key respect. With flexible labor supply, the "full" or "maximal"
value of the individual's human capital, W1, is included in total
wealth. By contrast, with labor supply fixed ex ante, the
individual's total wealth includes only his actual earnings,
W9(l—L*). Consequently, x' > x for all possible parameter
values.
Note that for the flexible labor supply case L depends
linearly on realized wealth (equation 6). It follows that
investment returns and labor income are perfectly negatively
10correlated. The individual, in effect, uses his labor supply to
provide himself insurance against investment risk.
Example 4. U(C,L) =CL3/a.Here, a and B are restricted to be
of the same sign and must satisfy a +B<1.One finds that:
L(z) [(B/(a+13)]W(z)/WB.
It will be convenient to define:
0(a)=[(—p1r1) -(1)_(p2r2) 3/(r2(pr2)1—r1(—p1r1) 2-)
Then,one finds,
x*=Ø(a)[W0(l+r)+W(]._L*)] (7)
and x' =O(a+B)[W0(1+r)+We). (8)
Remarks. i) Together, the log and power (isoelastic) functions
comprise the class of utility functions having constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA). For this class, the individual's optimal
investment in the risky asset is given by (7) or (8).(Note that
the parameters a and B satisfy a —1—RRACand B1 —RRAL,
where RRAC and RRAL are the coefficients of relative risk
aversion for consumption and leisure. In the log case, we have
RRACRRAI —1,so that a —B—0.)
ii) For the CRRA class, theindividual'soptimal investment
is proportional to total wealth --givenby the respective
bracketed terms in (7) and (8). For log utility, the "potential
earnings effect" ——thegap between W1(l—L*) and W! --isthe
sole difference between x* and x'. For isoelastic utility, x*
and x' differ not only because of the wealth effect, but also due
to the difference between •(a+B) and 0(a). For reference, we
11note thatis an increasing function.
Wage Uncertainty. So far our analysis has assumed a known future
value for labor income. It is natural to ask how uncertainty
about Wfl affects the propensity to invest in the risky asset. In
order to focus solely on the "uncertainty effect," we adopt the
following assumptions:
A2. i) W is a random variable with the same expected value as
in the certainty case.
ii) z and WH are independent random variables.
Remark. Since capital and labor are complementary factors of
production, it is likely that their returns are positively
correlated rather than uncorrelated. Moreover, many employees
own stock in their employer's firm. For them, there may even be
a higher correlation between their labor income and the return on
the risky asset. It is clear that this positive correlation will
reduce the individual's demand for the risky asset, both in the
fixed and flexible labor supply cases. We ignore this positive
correlation, however, in ord.r to focus on th. effect of
flexibility in labor supply on portfolio choice.
Under assumption A.2, 1st x** and x'' denote the
individual's optimal investment proportions under fixed and
flexible labor supply respectively. One can demonstrate the
following result.
12Proposition Two. Suppose the investor's utility function
displays constant relative risk aversion with respect to its
arguments. The introduction of wage uncertainty lowers optimal
investment in the risky asset regardless of whether laborsupply
is fixed or flexible (that is, x** <x*and x'' <x').
Nonetheless, the proportion invested in the risky asset is
greater in the case of flexible labor supply --thatis,
xl' >x**.
The proof rests on establishing that the first order term V
is concave in W. For instance, in the flexible laborcase, a
straightforward (but tedious) calculation confirms that V1 is
concave (evaluated at L(z) and x') for all parameter values. By
definition, x' is optimal in the certainty case-- that is,
V1(E[W11]) =0at x'. By Jensen's inequality and the concavity of
VI,itfollows that E[V1(W1)) <V1(E(W8])0 at x'. Thus, the
optimal investment proportion must be lowered to restore the
first—order condition, i.e. x'' <x'.
The argument for fixed labor supply is similar (V2 is
concave in W!) but contains one additional element. It is easy
to check that the first-order condition VL is convex in W8.
Thus, by Jensen's inequality, the introduction of a mean
preserving spread in W1 raises the optimal consumption of
leisure, L** >L*.Since V1 is decreasing in L, the optimal
proportion invested in the risky asset must be lowered, x <x*.
13Finally, straightforward computation establishes that
x'' >x.The difference between x'' and x** is less than the
difference between x' and x*, but there remains a difference.
Remark. In general, one can construct utility functions such
that the V1 and VL are concave convex in WH.Thus, the
unambiguous results obtained for the CRBA class need not hold for
an arbitrarily chosen utility function.
3. A Life Cycle Nodel.
In this section we use the lifetime consumption and
portfolio choice model of Samuelson [1969] and Merton [1969,
1971] to explore some of the implications of the interaction
between portfolio choice and labor supply over the life cycle.
Specifically, we are interested in testing the truth of
the conventional wisdom that the young can tolerate more risk in
their investment portfolios than the old.
Merton (1971) has analyzed optimal portfolio and saving
decisions in a life-cycl, model where there is continuous trading
and asset prices follow diffusion processes. This model can be
directly applied to the pr.s.nt problem after extending it
slightly to embrace two goods, consumption and leisure. As
before, we limit att.ntion to the case of two assets: one
riskiess and one risky.
The individual's problem is to choose (at each point in time
during the life-cycle) the proportion of wealth invested in the
risky asset, x(t), his current rat. of consumption, c(t), and his
14current leisure, L(t). His objective is to maximize his
discounted lifetime expected utility given by:
V —E[fTeJtu(c(t),L(t))dt
0
where 6 is his rate of time preference.
One can apply the Mertonian framework and (under specific
assumptions) derive closed form, analytic solutions for the
individual's optimal portfolio and consumption choices. Toward
this end, we limit our attention to utility functions which
display constant relative risk aversion. For this family, it is
well-known that optimal investment behavior over the life cycle
is "myopic" -—atany point in time, the investor always invests
the same proportion of his total wealth in the risky asset.
Indeed, the life-cycle investment rule is nearly identical
to the behavior in the simple two period model presented earlier.
Take the case of logarithmic utility: U —log(C)+rlog(L),as an
example. When labor supply is fixed, the optimal proportion of




where a and a2 are the instantaneous sean and variance of the
rate of return on the risky asset, W is current financial wealth,
and L* is th. optimal amount of leisure chosen by the inv.stor at
the start of his career.
Note the close similarity between equations 9 and 5.In the




where Y is the continuous stream of labor income, and T is the
last year of labor income.
From equation 9, one notes that as human capital is expended
over the course of the life cycle, the fraction of financial
wealth invested in the risky asset declines. It follows that x*
reaches its lowest value at the end of the individualts working
life, when W11 is zero.
When there is labor supply flexibility, the problem is
formally the same as a model in which there are two consumption
goods. The amount invested in the risky asset is independent of
how the individual chooses to divide his total consumption budget
between the first consumption good and leisure (the second




A comparison of (9) and (10) shows that the proportion invested
in the risky aseet is unaabiguously greater with flexible labor
supply than with fixed labor supply. Note that as the individual
grows older and W1 declines, the difference between x* and x'
becomes smaller.Thisimplies that flexibility in labor supply
is more important in the portfolio decisions of the young than of
the old.
16A concrete example is a useful way to display exact life—
cycle investment and saving dynamics. At age 31, an individual
has $100,000 of financial wealth and has the opportunity to earn
maximum labor income of $60,000 per year (if he were to consume
no leisure). He can work until age 71. For the time being we
abstract from his retirement decision altogether.5 That is, his
planning problem ends at age 71, when he plans to have zero
financial wealth. (One may think of him as working until he dies
or having retirement income provided by other means.)
Table 1 and Figure 1 summarize the individual's optimal
life-cycle behavior in the case of logarithmic utility,
U =Log(C)+.5Log(L),and for real asset returns:
r =.03,a =.09,and a2.12. Labor is flexible in Part a of
the table; it is fixed in Parts b and c. In Part b, the
individual's leisure is fixed at L.55, matching the expected
leisure in the flexible labor case. In Part c, leisure is fixed
at L .33, the cx ante optimal value.
Our objective is to focus on the advantages of labor
flexibility during the individual's working life. Obviously,
choosing when to retire is another way of exercising labor supply
flexibility.Research in progress by the authors analyzes the
rstirsa.nt decision as an optimal stopping problem. Since this
latter approach is very different from our current concerns, it is
omitted here.
17Table 1. Life Cycle Portfolio Choice and Consumption of Goods
and Leisure
ASSTJMPTIONS:U —log(C)+.5log(L);
r =.03,a =.09,and a2 .12.
Maximum labor income is $60,000 per year,
initial financial wealth $100,000.
NOTE: All variables ar. in thousands of dollars except the
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INVESTMENT IN RISKY ASSET
0VR TI-E LIFE CYCLE
Figure 1. Investment in the Risky Asset as a Multiple of
Financial Wealth
ASSUMPTIONS:U =log(C)+.5log(L);
r =.03,a =.09,and a2 =.12.
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AGE
a FLEXIBLE +L•3 0 L *55The table's lead column shows the individual's optimal
investment proportion as a multiple of his current financial
wealth.6 Observe that under either labor supply regime, the
values of x are well in excess of one ——thatis, the individual
is borrowing at the risk-free rate to finance his investment in
the risky asset. As the example illustrates, the individual's
degree of leverage is greatest early in the life cycle and when
labor supply is flexible.
Casual empiricism suggests that young workers do tend to
have highly leveraged portfolios. The major asset held by the
youngis residential real estate financed in large part with
mortgage loans. The model also predicts that households with
greater labo flexibility will tend to have riskier investment
portfolios. This hypothesis is a subject for future research.
The other columns show expected values of the key wealth and
consumption variables.7 The table's second column tracks the
individual's human capital ——thepresent value of his future
labor earnings-- over the life cycle. This component of wealth
is non—stochastic. Under flexible labor, human capital embodies
the individual's maximum labor income($60,000per annum), before
6 is straightforward to confirm that for the given asset
returns,the agent optimally invests 50% of his current total
wealth (W +W!)in the risky asset. Table l's lead column shows
the corresponding proportion of the individual's financial wealth
(W) going to the risky asset.
Analytic expressions for the expected investment and
consumption behavior can be found in Merton (1969 and 1971).
Extending these results in thecaseof flexible labor supply (i.e.
two consumption goods) is straightforward.
20income is withdrawn to purchas. the consumption good and leisure.
In the case of fixed labor, human capital measures the present
discounted value of the individual's actual yearly earnings,
(l-L)W. As emphasized earlier, this is the key difference
between the fixed and flexible cases. In the former, investments
in the risky asset are based on actual human capital; in the
latter, they are based on maximum, potential human capital.
The table's third column shows the expected value of
financial wealth (a stochastic variable) over the life cycle.
Note that the (average) growth in financial wealth is much
greater under flexible labor than under fixed (for either L =.55
or L =.33).This is a direct result of the greater investment
in the risky asset when labor is flexible.
The table's final two columns show the life—cycle pattern of
consumption and leisure. For convenience, we have assumed a
particular rate of time preference: 6.06. This knife-edge
value insures that the individual's expected consumption and
leisure behavior is constant over the life cycle.In the
flexible labor case, the combination of labor income and
investment income support an expected annual consumption flow of
$65,900 and expected leisure of .55. By contrast, when labor and
leisure are fixed (at L —.55),th. supportable steady-state
consumption stream is only $48,200 per year.
Since the agent invests 50% of his total wealth in the
risky asset, the overall expected return on his (total) wealth is
E(z) —(.5)(3%)+(.5)(9%)—6%.Choosing a matching rate of time
preference insures a level consumption stream on average.
21It is important to recognize that Table l's consumption and
leisure entries (since they are expected values) exaggerate the
utility differences between the fixed and flexible cases.
Fortunately, exact analytic expressions for the individual's
lifetime expected utility can be readily developed. A natural
way to express the welfare cost associatedwith fixed labor
supply is to compute the proportional increase in lifetime total
wealth (defined as the present value of maximum labor income plus
financial wealth at age 31) necessary to leave the individual as
well off under fixed labor as under flexible.
For Part b, the proportional increase in wealth is 12%.
This is to say that on top of his initial .fetime total wealth
($1,498,000), the individual would need an additional $175,000 to
bring him the same level of utility as he'd enjoy with flexible
labor. In Part c, the individual makes an ex ante optimal
leisure choice, L* =.33.Here, one computes the compensating
differential to be $133,000 (9% of lifetime total wealth).
It is interesting to observe that the individual's optimal
ex ante choice of leisure (L* =.33)is considerably smaller than
the average amount of leisure (L.55) chosen in the case of
flexible labor. It is straightforward to carry out the requisite
optimization in each case to obtain closed—form expressions for
decision variables of interest.
The simplest expressions emerge when initial financial
wealth is zero. In this case, the optimal ex ante choice of
leisure is simply L* =r/(l+r).Leisure is determined once and
22for all (as if it were a Nstockw variable).Here, L* depends
only on the individual's utility trade-off, not on any aspects of
security returns.9 In turn, the individual's lifetime
consumption stream is (l-L*)S =tl/(l+rfls,where S is the level
of consumption supportable by the flow of future labor income, Y,
in combination with optimal investment behavior.
By contrast, in the case of flexible labor supply leisure is
determined optimally as a flow variable. Again, let S denote the
level of total spending (on consumption and leisure) supported by
the (maximum) flow of labor income Y. It is easy to check that
(on average) a fraction r/[(l+r)Y] of this spending is on
leisure, implying that L' =[r/(l+r)][S/Y].(Recall that L' is
the expected fraction of time consumed as leisure; actual leisure
choice varies with investment performance.) As long as the risky
asset's expected return exceeds the risk-free return, the
sustainable flow of total consumption exceeds the flow of labor
earnings: S >Y.Consequently,L' is greater than L*. In turn,
expected spending on the consumption good is given by [l/(l+r)]S
—-identicalto expected consumption in the case of fixed labor
supply. (In the exampl. above, if initial financial wealth is
zero instead of $100,000, one finds L*.33, L' .51, and the
annual rate of consumption is $61,500 under either fixed or
flexible labor.)
In the case of logarithmic utility, the individual's
expected lifetime utility (under optimal decisions) is proportional
to log((1-L)W) +Flog(L).Thus, L* depends only on I', measuring
the trade-off between the stocks of wealth and leisure.
23Surnmarv. Theanalysis of this section shows that the results
from the life—cycle model closely resemble those of the simpler
two-period model. For the class of utility functions displaying
constant relative risk aversion, flexible labor supply generates
a strong investment effect, x' >x*,——afar greater proportion
of assets is invested in the risky asset. In the life—cycle
model, there is also a compounding effect: withflexible labor,
larger initial investments in the risky assetlead to more rapid
accumulation of wealth on average, leading to still greater risky
investments. The difference in investment behavior between the
fixed and flexible labor cases is greatest early in the life—
cycle when the individual's stock of human capital is greatest.
Finally, the welfare advantage of labor flexibility is
significant for typical numerical examples.1°
4. SummarY and Conclusion.
The model developed in this paper suggests that labor supply
flexibility can play an important role in household asset
allocation. Based on this model we expect to find that in a
10Life—cyclebehavior for utility functions of the form,
U(C,L) =CaL3/a,closelyresembles that displayed for the
logarithmic case.The sole difference is an effectowing to the
degreeof risk aversion. For utilityfunctions more risk averse
than the logarithmic (a and finegative),the difference in
investment behavior and welfare between the flexible and fixed
cases is diminished. For example, with a =-2and B —1, the
necessary compensating differentials in wealth fall to 2% and 3%
when labor is fixed ex ante respectively at L* and L' (the expected
value under flexible leisure). For utility functions more risk
tolerant than the logarithmic (a andpositive), the differences
between the fixed and flexible cases are magnified.
24cross-section of households the proportion of assets held in
risky investments will increase with the degree of labor supply
flexibility. No empirical study of household financial behavior
of which we are aware has tried to test this hypothesis.
How can we measure labor supply flexibility for this
purpose? First, it is probably true that households with more
than one adult have more flexibility than single people. So
family status is a potential measure of flexibility. Second,
occupation is another potential indicator of flexibility. Many
occupations offer opportunities for working extra hours, taking
extra jobs, or delaying retirement.
Our life cycle model suggests that age is another important
determinant of household portfolio behavior. A well-specified
empirical model would have to take age into account.
Labor supply flexibility is valuable. In future research we
intend to measure just how valuable. People can increase their
labor supply flexibility by investing in education and training
(in an effort to make their skills more transferable). Thus the
value of this flexibility is crucial for determining the optimal
investment in human capital. Most studies of investment in humar
capital ignore this insurance motive.
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26APPENDIX
Proofof Proposition One: x' >x*.
Step 1) In the flexible case, we first identify the
individual's leisure choice in response to fluctuations
in wealth. To do this. take the total differential of
the first-order condition in (3) with respect to W and
L and rearrange to obtain:
dL/dW =[W1U-
UCL]/[ (We)2tJ -2WHUCL+
Thedenominator is simply VLL (the second—order
condition) and is, of course, negative. For the
moment, consider the case that the numerator is also
negative, so that dL/dW >0--thatis, leisure is a
normal good.
Step 2) Confirm that L1 <L*<L.To see this, evaluate VL in
(1) first at L (where it is positive) and then at L2
(where it is negative). Thus, the optimal ex ante
choice of leisure lies between the ex post leisure
decisions.
Step3) Show that x' >x*.To see this, evaluate V1 in (2) and
(4) at x*, the ex ante optimal level of investment in
the risky asset. By definition, at x*, V10 in (2).
27By comparison, in (4) we find that because of ex post
labor flexibility, V >0at x*. The argument is
straightforward. If the higher return (z2) is
realized, the individual's marginal utility of
consumption (the second term in 4) is greater at L2
than at L*. The derivative of this term with respect
to L is pZr2[—WHUCC +U]>0.(The bracketed term is
identical, except for sign, to the numerator of dL/dW
in step 1. Since leisure isnormal good, the
bracketed term is positive.) Thus, the increase in
leisure from L* to L2 raises the second term in (4).
If the lower return is realized, marginal utility (the
first term in 4) increases as well. Here, the
derivative with respect to L is p1r1[-WU +UCL]<0,
since r1 <0.Thus, the decrease from L* to L1
increases the first term. Therefore, we have shown
that V1 >0,at x* in expression (4). To restore the
first-order condition, the investment in the risky
asset must be increased. Consequently, x' >x*.
Step 4) If leisure is an inferior good, repeat steps 2 and 3
changing the direction of the inequalities where
appropriate: L1 >L*>L2.Next, examine the effect of
flexible leisure on V1 in (4) evaluated at x*. Again,
one finds that, term by term, marginal utility is
increased. (Note that relative to the normal case, the
28signs of the derivative are reversed but So are the
changes in leisure.) Again we find x' > x*, investment
in the risky asset increases due to labor
flexibility."
' The interested readermay wish to test this result with an
example. LetU(C,L) (.5C + kC2 + L —•5L2]A,where $isin the
unit interval. When k is in the positive neighborhood of zero,
leisure is an inferior good. The combination of negative U and
inferior leisure results in x' > x.
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